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INTRODUCTION
“Every time there's a new tool, whether it's Internet or cell phones or anything
else, all these things can be used for good or evil. Technology is neutral;
it depends on how it's used.” ~ Rick Smolan
Although the internet itself is not new, it is continually reinventing itself. As it
changes, people use it in novel ways that bring new and sometimes terrible
consequences. And so, in late August of 2014, one of the internet’s newer
evolutions, social media, was thrust into the center of controversy as popular social
media websites like Twitter began circulating a terrifying video far and wide
throughout the vast reaches of their audiences. A man clad in black, waving a knife
in his hand and issuing threats to America, stood menacingly in a desert scene.
Another man knelt calmly before him. This man,
James Foley,
was just
moments from death
when his captor’s blade would separate his head from his
body
. The aftermath of the gruesome scene and the threating message that
accompanied it were suddenly catapulted across all reaches of society as people on
social media sites shared the video, some for its shock value and others who were
simply in disbelief of what they just watched. But there were others who, with their
estimated 45,000 associated Twitter accounts, intentionally shared the video for its
message and helped launch ISIS and its quest for a caliphate onto the global center
stage (Berger, 2015).
Since then, social media platforms have waged a hard, but ill-fought battle
against terror groups using the platforms to spread propaganda, recruit, and
ultimately radicalize new individuals for their cause around the world. But what, if
any, notable effects does this method have on these individuals and how they are
recruited and radicalized? Is social media really a drastically new form of
recruitment, or is it simply the latest technological convenience being used to
communicate just as cell phones were when they were invented? This paper will
examine this research question: do any significant differences exist between social
media radicalization and recruitment methods as compared to other more traditional
methods. This author hypothesizes that social media has created significant new
recruiting advantages for terror organizations and that it has also introduced a new
form of online self-radicalization that did not previously exist. This theory will be
examined through a meta-analysis of researchers’ studies on the recruitment
strategies of terror groups and the radicalization process of group and lone-wolf
terrorists. The hypothesis of a new kind of online self-radicalization will be
examined through a case study of the 2019 terror attack on Christchurch, New
Zealand. Finally, in light of these findings, recommendations will be made as to
how the government, social media companies, and society should address these

new trends in terror recruitment. Special attention is given to poorly understood
concepts such as how communications through social media platforms and other
internet forums function different than more direct, traditional methods of
communication.
VIRTUAL RECRUITMENT AND RADICALIZATION: A LITERATURE REVIEW
Internet-based communication platforms, and social media in particular, have
quickly become the predominant communication and recruitment mediums for new
members of international terror organizations (Aly; Blaker; Hamm; Koehler;
Smith). They are used to target recruits from younger generations who are already
familiar with this technology as a regular part of their everyday lives. For example,
groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS have been known for posting martyrdom videos to
the internet to inspire new recruits while regularly engaging in online chatrooms
and instant messaging through sites like Facebook and Twitter to communicate
directly with potential recruits (Smith, 2018). Extreme right-wing groups have
begun to migrate from political rallies and specific websites to using social media
as their main propaganda tools for radicalizing new individuals (Koehler, 2014).
While other more traditional methods of recruitment are still utilized by these kinds
of groups, the dominance of recruiting via social media is an important trend to
analyze because of the significant recruiting advantages it affords radical groups
over other forms of communication like cell phones, radio, email, and face-to-face
meetings.
Social Media as a Recruitment Tool
The ability to recruit via social media offers terror organizations several distinct
advantages when attempting to find, recruit, and radicalize new individuals for their
cause. First, social media sites afford organizations with limited resources an
immediate global audience. The growing interconnectedness of the world via the
internet is helping radical terror groups effortlessly expand their reach across
international borders that their recruitment capabilities might otherwise be confined
to (Aly; Blaker; Gill; Huey). This dramatically expands the number of potential
recruits and supporters these groups can reach and creates second-order effects with
substantial benefits. For example, by virtually recruiting individuals overseas to
carry out foreign terror attacks, these groups save significant sums of money that
would have been spent on international travel. Additionally, by avoiding frequent
travel in and out of their host country to the target nation, they also avoid the risk
of being detected by authorities abroad.
A second recruitment benefit is that social media enables individuals with a
high potential of being radicalized to seek out the terror groups on their own by

browsing digital content and initiating dialogue (Aly; Gill; Hamm; Huey). This
saves these organizations from bearing the entire burden of trying to locate potential
recruits and helps them connect with many who would otherwise be overlooked
simply because of a lack of direct personal connections. In particular, “lone wolf”
radicals, individuals who may carry out acts of violence by themselves, now have
access to digital communication mediums that help them seek out other people with
similar radical beliefs. This provides opportunity for dialogue with other radicals
when previously they were isolated individuals and lacked the confidence that
comes from group identity (Hamm; Smith). This process also has the potential to
serve as a risk reduction tool for recruiters. As individuals who are comfortable
with radical messaging will seek out, find, and engage with the recruiters online,
the organizations reduce the risk of exposing their ties to terror with non-radical
individuals who would report their activity.
The most widely researched recruitment benefit afforded by social media is
its ability to cultivate an echo chamber for the radical beliefs of new recruits while
creating a community to draw them into (Behr; Gill; Hamm; Klausen; Smith;
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime). Social media, unlike traditional forms
of media such as cable television or newspapers, provides content that can be
curated exclusively by the end user. As people have a natural tendency to follow
sources of information with which they agree, recruiters can encourage new recruits
to follow and digest more radical sources of thought and tune out other ideas (Behr;
Klausen). This reinforcement of ideas proves effective in getting the individual to
more closely identify with the expressed radical sentiments. More importantly, the
recruits now see similar information coming from a number of people, accounts,
organizations, etc. and begin to build a sense of belonging to a community beyond
their individual self (Behr; Gill; Smith; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime).
Additionally, this creates a sense of “strength in numbers”
or “
pack”
mentality that can encourage individual “ lone wolves”
to carry out actions
they would not otherwise do on their own without encouragement from the group.
Social Media as a Radicalization Mechanism
Recruitment is only the first step in interacting with a radical individual who could
potentially commit acts of terror. In order for the individual to progress to the point
where they are willing to carry out acts of violence, typically against a rational
understanding of self-interest, a more robust process of radicalization must take
place. Whether or not social media can actually provide a sufficient medium for the
full radicalization process to take place is a matter of debate. On one end of the
spectrum, some research indicates there are cases where the vast majority of an
individual’s radicalization occurred via the internet and social media (Blaker,
2015). This was the case for more than 3000 individuals who left behind their lives

in developed Western nations to join the enlisted ranks of the Islamic State of Iraq
and Syria (ISIS). Cases like these, however, are often associated with particular
groups and do not necessarily warrant extrapolation to other instances of
radicalization. On the other end of the spectrum are those who argue that full
radicalization can only occur from real-world interactions between people and that
social media only acts as a transmitter of information (Huey, 2015). This assertion,
though, does not offer a robust explanation for terror attacks carried out by
individuals or small groups with no direct, physical access to the parent terror
organization.
As such, the majority of the literature on this subject falls somewhere
between these two extremes. It is widely thought that social media is at minimum
a successful facilitator of radicalization, but it must be coupled with other factors
(Behr; Gill; Huey; Smith). The most significant factors are group dynamics, such
as affinity for one another (perceived or real), and group strength (Klausen; Smith).
It is also commonly held that radicalization is not dependent on the use of social
media and it is debatable whether or not it can accelerate the radicalization process
(Behr; Gill). It is, however, particularly effective at radicalizing lone individuals
who require group interaction and encouragement in order to progress to the more
advanced stages of radicalization that create a willingness to commit violent acts.
The psychological effects are particularly strong on these individuals as recruiters
are able to more easily manipulate them to alter their beliefs by rewarding them
with group affinity. Ultimately, they lead the recruit to create a sense of identity
associated with more extreme behaviors (Aly; Hamm; Klausen; United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime).
The question that looms over the debate on the efficacy of radicalization via
social media is whether or not this new medium differs in substantial and significant
ways from traditional media and other means of communication such that it is more
effective, or if it is simply a new tool in the recruiter’s toolbox that has limited
capabilities. While no studies are conclusive on this point, the current literature
does provide clues as to what makes social media so potent as a medium for
recruitment and radicalization.
Social Media’s Impact on Terrorism
A number of factors work seamlessly together to facilitate social media’s impact
on terror organization recruitment. First, social media provides complete control
over messaging to the terror organization (Aly; Huey; Klausen). This differs
drastically from the traditional terror/media/audience relationship of newspapers
and television where an organization could commit an act to get their message out,
but whether or not it was portrayed sympathetically was at the mercy of the media.
Now, these organizations can reach just as broad of an audience, while tailoring the

messaging attached to their acts to those they are trying to influence the most. This
relates to the second compounding factor. Social media allows for the rapid
dissemination of information to the intended audience (Huey; Klausen; United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime). Terror organizations can message followers
around the world with minute-by-minute details. A clear example of this occurred
in 2013 when al-Shabaab live-tweeted their attack on the Westgate shopping center
in Nairobi (Aly, 2017). This ability to not only send information quickly, but to be
able to include videos, professionally made images, or other culturally relevant
forms of messaging heightens the effectiveness of this recruitment method (Aly;
Huey; Klausen).
These factors and others contribute to the efficacy of social media
recruitment and radicalization that make this form of communication
fundamentally different than previous forms. They have replaced the need for
physical contact of recruits and brought professional-grade messaging formats to
an instant audience of the organization’s own choosing, making social media one
of the most important factors in individual radicalization (Huey; Koehler; United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime). Those who disagree largely base their
argument on the notion that social media by itself has rarely been the sole factor in
radicalization, claiming that other forms of contact or communication are needed
(Behr; Gill). But this does not disprove the idea that radicalization can be achieved
solely online nor does it negate that social media platforms and virtual interactions
like web chats often double for the other factors such as community and personal
interaction. So, while there are some natural advantages to recruiting new
operatives through in-person interactions, social media has nonetheless expanded
the recruiter’s reach far beyond what would otherwise be possible.
Research Gaps
As it stands, the current literature provides deep analysis of an array of modern
terror recruitment techniques conducted via the internet and social media platforms.
What is missing, generally, is actionable data. Too little is known, publicly at least,
to be able to draw wide conclusions or make comparisons about different forms of
terror-related messaging and their overall efficacy in converting followers into
violent terrorists. The literature is also currently limited almost exclusively to
Islamic terrorism and some American right-wing radical groups’ recruitment
tactics. Other kinds of radical, terroristic organizations need to be studied to find
patterns or dissimilarities between their utilization of social media and the ones
described. If and when these deeper conclusions can be made across violent groups,
better-informed decisions about how to disrupt these recruitment tactics can be
made. Presently, most of the efforts focus on simply banning the social media
accounts supporting terror groups, but it has proven to be nearly impossible to shut

them all down as they can be created just as quickly as they are shut down (Blaker,
2015). This “whack-a-mole” approach is not sustainable in the long term as terror
groups can find ways to avoid such bans by utilizing social media websites and
apps that are more difficult for law enforcement to track their activity on. Instead,
the present challenge demands a more robust approach to locate, counter, and
disempower this messaging.
METHODS
This paper examines recommended best practices for the three principal players in
addressing the use of social media in spreading terror: the government, social media
companies, and society at large. These three entities were chosen because they bear
unique roles in how terror groups are able to spread their messaging through social
media via their abilities to curb it legally, prevent and remove it voluntarily, and
respond to it, respectively. Specifically, sources were chosen for their
documentation of such prevention efforts in recent history and for their analysis
and recommendations of best practices going forward. The conclusions drawn from
this wide analysis will be applied to a recent case, the March 15th, 2019 terror
attacks on two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand. This particular attack was
chosen among other examples for several reasons. First, it is one of the clearest
examples of the evolving roles of the internet and social media platforms as they
pertain to radicalizing individuals towards violence as well as their use for
spreading the intended message of the terror attack. Second, this attack challenges
popular notions of what kinds of extremism should be most pertinent to prevention
efforts. While it can be shown that much work has been done to curtail social media
messaging of prominent jihadist organizations like ISIS and Al Qaeda, far less
attention has been given to smaller terror organizations of varying intents, including
those promoting racial supremacy or anti-Islamic sentiments such as those the
Christchurch terrorist was linked with. Finally, by examining this attack in detail,
clues about gaps in the current prevention system can be assessed, the responses to
the attack by the three chosen stakeholders can be critiqued, and further
recommendations can be made as a result. If this attack is at all predictive of future
developments in terror and the use of social media, it is thus important that it is
examined in detail against current methods and assumptions.
This paper will not examine the use of private messaging apps or other oneto-one electronic communication platforms in detail. These will be addressed in
general as the use of encrypted messaging is pertinent to the larger issue of
terrorism but falls beyond the scope of this paper. Rather, this paper will look more
closely at how messaging on large public forums for social interaction should be
addressed as it has vastly different implications for society at large, as opposed to
infiltrating the messaging systems of terror networks that are composed of

established members. So, while these trends are important to note, their solutions
are markedly different than those that can be employed by the government, social
media network giants, and the public for responding to propaganda that is
ultimately intended to reach a public audience. Between them, these three groups
also face different legal and moral questions regarding the actions they can take.
NEW ZEALAND CASE STUDY
March 15, 2019. 40 injured. 51 dead. These simple statistics cannot begin to
describe the visceral pain inflicted upon New Zealand’s Christchurch and its
Muslim community. As details trickled out about this devastating terror attack, one
realization was quickly made clear: the terrorism of the past several decades was
over, and terrorism in the age of social media had just begun. The lone terrorist
made a field day out of the capabilities of social media in this new age. On the day
before the attack, he posted pictures of his weapons on 8chan. On the day of, he
released his lengthy political manifesto, filled with references to social media
culture, on Twitter. A video of the attack itself was live streamed on Facebook for
the whole world to see (Bogost, 2019). The attacker was virtually linked with
multiple white supremacist groups from Australia, including through the Facebook
pages of the United Patriots Front (UPF) and the True Blue Crew (Mann et al.,
2019).
It is immediately clear that this attack, while ultimately stemming from
extreme white supremacist and anti-immigrant beliefs, was largely influenced by
the use and powers of social media. The shooter had been actively following online
groups and participating in chat rooms
that supported his beliefs and he played
to the strengths of social media to get his manifesto and video of the attack to spread
as far and wide and as quickly as possible. The most shocking revelation from this
attack, however, is that this terrorist not only acted alone, but he was completely
self-radicalized. Contrary to what many of the authors in the previous literature
review have theorized, this shooting concretely demonstrated the ability for social
media to be used to completely radicalize a terrorist for a cause without any direct
communication or influence from an actual violent group. The shooter had isolated
himself from community by choosing to live off of an inheritance and not seek out
work (Zaczek, 2019). From there, he became radicalized by far-right antiimmigrant views through looking at message boards and Facebook groups. Despite
deriving his views from these online mediums, he received no direct calls to
violence from any members of these groups and never formed any sort of actual
group identity with other extremists (Ravndal, 2019). Rather, the group bonding
and group identity that is normally thought necessary to radicalize someone to
commit acts of terrorism for a specific, shared ideology never took place. This
vindicates the proposed hypothesis that direct recruitment and traditional group

isolation and identity formation processes are not required to fully radicalize a
terrorist. They can self-isolate and self-radicalize entirely on their own through the
use and influence of online propaganda and social media, even when it is not used
for two-way communication. This case should serve as a cause for major rethinking
about what is required in the radicalization process and how we go about trying to
prevent it in the first place. Traditional methods may apply to traditional cases, but
they will be of little use in stopping violent terrorists who are effectively isolated,
indoctrinated, and radicalized to action without ever even corresponding with the
groups that they are being influenced by.
After this terror attack, the New Zealand government responded quickly.
Besides placing a ban on semi-automatic rifles, they took action regarding media
content as well. First, they asked the social media platforms themselves to help
curtail the spread of the shooter’s messages. Facebook reported taking down 1.5
million copies of the video. The New Zealand police quickly urged people not to
share the video of the attack or the manifesto, under threat of law (Lieu, 2019). In
fact, an eighteen-year-old was arrested and charged for sharing the livestream of
the shooting (Australian Associated Press, 2019). The New Zealand Government’s
response demonstrated a clear desire to swiftly combat the terrorist’s social media
goals with force while collaborating with the private companies the propaganda
was hosted on. The success of their attempts to stop the dissemination of the content
should be closely
studied from multiple perspectives as the methods they used
to suppress the information will likely prove controversial in other countries like
the United States. Whether or not these heavy-handed approaches will effectively
prevent another similar attack cannot be known for some time. N ations around
the world would be wise to study the response to this attack closely as test
of whether or not their own anti-terrorism methods need to be altered or enhanced
in the age of social media.
GOVERNMENT RESPONSE
From the Joint Terrorism Task Force, counter-terrorism military units, and the
Department of Homeland Security, to city police forces and local school district
memorandums, terrorism h as forcefully seized the attention of every level of
government and poses hard questions that must be addressed by every governing
body involved in public security. While many lessons have been learned and turned
into effective policy, the recent trend in social media influence on terrorism has
opened up a new set of quandaries. This medium of terror can’t be fought with
bullets and is resilient to deterrence by laws. Nevertheless, government agencies
must be
determined to act on this trend and prevent further tragedy through
legal means that value both the lives of citizens and their individual rights.

As is often the case in analysis, determining what not to do is just as
important as figuring out what to do. The government certainly has its place in
addressing this issue, but the boundaries of what are useful must first be set.
Without the ability to directly remove terror propaganda online or arrest inciters
abroad, many initial plans by the federal government involved counter-messaging.
These kinds of initiatives have roots in the early 2000s when the Bush
administration attempted to improve the United States’ image in the Middle East
through government sponsored messaging via TV broadcasting. Studies showed,
however, that this government-sponsored messaging actually worsened attitudes
towards the U.S. (Bipartisan Policy Center, 2018). With the rising prominence of
ISIS, the State Department’s Center for Strategic Counterterrorism
Communications (CSCC) (today it functions under the State Department’s Global
Engagement Center) began counter-messaging campaigns online that directly
interacted
with extremist sympathizers. The intent this time around, having
learned from previous mistakes, was not to make the U.S. and its allies look good,
but rather to be critical of the terror organizations themselves. This endeavor has
also been regarded as largely unsuccessful and has even created unintended
consequences such as legitimizing and drawing attention to otherwise unimportant,
minor social media accounts by extremists (Bipartisan Policy Center, 2018). Other
federal programs housed in places like the Department of Defense have met similar
embarrassing failures.
While counter-messaging from state-sponsored media is generally illadvised, the government does have another option that can be drastically more
successful, though it is met with its own challenges. Rather than combatting
existing online rhetoric, the government can attempt to remove and prevent the
spread of violent extremist propaganda online. Instead of trying to counter
messages, simply denying terror organizations the ability to utilize these publicfacing platforms may be more effective. Given all the benefits of online recruitment
outlined in the literature review, it should be considered a worthwhile endeavor.
The primary hindrances to this approach, however, are typically the laws of the
country wanting to counter online extremism. Many nations protect inflammatory
speech from government censorship, although this varies country-to-country.
European nations, for example, often have more flexibility to outlaw certain kinds
of speech, such as Germany did in 2017 when it mandated social media platforms
remove illegal terror speech within 24 hours of it being posted (Bipartisan Policy
Center, 2018). Nations like the United States, on the other hand, face more obstacles
as concerns about protecting the constitutional right to free speech are brought into
question. Typically, graphic images and speech that would be considered “hate
speech” are protected under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
In order for speech to meet standards that allow for it to be censored, it must insight
direct violence or pose a “clear and present danger” to other people (Haughom,

2016). While some terror propaganda can meet this threshold, the Federal
Government is typically reserved in how it handles such cases. While it is wise for
the government to continue to show deference to the free speech rights of its own
citizens, it nevertheless cannot afford to dismiss the real danger posed by terror
organizations’ influence online. For instance, ISIS frequently claimed
responsibility for lone-wolf terror attacks perpetrated by people influenced through
its online calls for violence. E lectronic literature published by Al Qaeda affiliates
influenced the Boston Marathon Bombers, the Pulse Nightclub shooter was
radicalized online, and dozens of ISIS videos were found on the cellphone of the
perpetrator
of the 2017 New York City truck ramming attack (Isacson, 2018).
In the case of the New Zealand terror attack in Christchurch, the government did
respond by outlawing the sharing of any terror content related to the incident
through social media (Lieu, 2019). It has yet to be seen if their government will
attempt any counter-messaging campaigns or if they will focus strictly on targeting
the removal of terror propaganda online. Other nations should closely watch this
case as it
continues to unfold and see whether or not these methods were
successful in preventing the distribution of these materials, reducing future
incidents of terror or hate crimes, and if the general public is accepting of these
imposed restrictions.
SOCIAL MEDIA ORGANIZATIONS’ RESPONSE
With the government’s hands largely tied with respect to preventing and removing
terror propaganda
, an answer must come from the private sector. In previous
years, social media companies often held themselves as unadulterated protectors of
free speech. Twitter even once promised that it would never censor terrorists on its
platform. But today that landscape has changed dramatically as large social media
platforms face increasing public pressure to curtail their role in acts of violence.
Presently
, these networks employ three primary methods to disrupt the
distribution of terror propaganda. First, many of these companies employ thousands
of human reviewers who can sift through flagged content and deem it unacceptable
for violating terms and conditions that specify that calls to extremism are not
tolerated. This flagged content often then falls into the second method which is
called automated blacklisting (Leetaru, 2018). When content has been flagged as
unacceptable, an electronic ‘tag’ marks it so that if the same content appears again
on the platform (e.g., a viral terror video making the rounds on Facebook) it will be
automatically blocked before it can be shared again. While this method proved to
be more scalable than relying on expensive human workers, it is not as precise as it
cannot detect new content nor intelligently determine whether or not content
violates established rules. This brought about the need for the third category of
mechanisms: artificial intelligence and machine learning algorithms. Companies

like Google have developed state-of-the-art software programs that can identify
extremist messaging in foreign languages, pick up inflammatory terrorist speech
amidst loud propaganda videos, and even use reverse image searching to identify
terror organization symbols and references embedded in images (Leetaru, 2018).
According to these companies’ own data, “every single minute there are on average
510,000 comments and 136,000 photos shared on Facebook, 350,000 tweets posted
on Twitter, and 300 hours of video uploaded to YouTube” (Macdonald, 2018). With
this tremendous amount of content to sift through, many of these organizations have
teamed up to share database information to help each other more quickly recognize
terror-related content when terror groups attempt to shift social media platforms
after getting banned on one of them (Macdonald, 2018).
The largest challenge to this now successful process is that terror groups are
increasingly able to utilize the reach of these public media platforms while hosting
their content on smaller sites through a method called outlinking. Put s imply,
they can host their content on smaller platforms that lack the resources to effectively
fight their messages and spread links to it through the major media outlets and these
posts go unmolested as the links themselves possess no content that will be flagged
by a blacklist or even artificial intelligence. Finally, once they have successfully
recruited new members, they can utilize encrypted messaging sites like Telegram
so that none of their conversations can be picked up by social media sites and
handed over to authorities (Macdonald, 2018).
While private social media companies do not have the same legal obligation
to protect free speech that the government does, they should nevertheless make
careful considerations for what kind of speech they will target for removal. A net
cast too narrowly will miss harmful content that can lead to violent radicalization,
while a net cast too wide may lead to the removal of speech that is legal, even if
undesirable. Recent conversations in the United States about this kind of
censorship, which is often accused of being politically motivated even when
companies claim it is done for harm-reduction reasons, have begun to push for the
removal of Section 230 protections for social media companies from the federal
Communications Decency Act. Some proponents of this action argue that social
media companies are acting as publishers when they choose to censor speech based
on political content rather than legality, and therefore should lose protections
intended for websites that simply host third-party generated content. Others argue
that social media companies are actually not doing enough to remove harmful
content or prevent illegal actions on their platforms (Allyn, 2021). If social media
companies veer too far one way or the other, they may either find themselves having
to choose to not censor any content, or they may have to become something akin to
regular publishers in order to avoid litigation due to content posted on their sites by
third parties. The best option, it seems, would be to improve the precision of content
moderation policies and capabilities to ensure that illegal content, including calls

to radicalization and extremist violence, is removed, while other protected speech,
including political speech, is protected vigorously. By tiptoeing across this thin
tightrope, social media companies may be able to strike a balance that preserves
their Section 230 protections, allows for free speech on their platforms, and protects
society-at-large from the dangers of virtual radicalization via social media.
SOCIETAL RESPONSE
Defining terrorism is difficult. Understanding exactly what constitutes this
designation will always be a subject of debate as methods of attacks and the agendas
behind them continue to change shape. But one piece of the puzzle that has
remained constant is the audience. All terror attacks have an intended audience
beyond the immediate victims that is meant to react in some way to the attack. That
is what fundamentally sets terrorism apart from other means of violence like crime
or war. Despite this key element of what makes terrorism, terrorism, there is a
profoundly shocking lack of academic or even journalistic writing on what or how
society itself should respond to these new kinds of attacks or try to prevent them. It
is a fatal mistake to assume that only the government or large private entities are
capable of having an impact on how and why terror occurs. Ultimately, terrorism’s
lasting effects take a toll on society as a whole and the effects of social media have
only served to amplify its reach and lasting impact (Innes, 2015).
Whatever methods are taken to prevent terror messaging or recruitment, it
must be remembered that the root of all terrorist activity is the impact it seeks to
have on its audience. But if that audience doesn’t give terror the time of day, then
the terror might just go away. Violent acts may still occur, but it is likely that they
will be far less frequent as the appeal that fame and importance have slowly drift
away. If this country really wants to protect itself, it must start by changing the way
this generation plays into the hands of the terrorists and teaching the next generation
to do the same. The Christchurch attack cannot be ignored. It is a crystal-clear
example of how modern society and its social media inundation have enabled and
emboldened individual terrorists to act with shocking levels of sophistication to
achieve their political aims. If its causes go ignored, our own nation and others like
it may be doomed to repeat it. Ironically, perhaps, paying additional focus to this
attack may finally help us understand what has gone so horribly wrong with the
way our modern society fixates on these terror attacks and inadvertently elevates
the political aims of the perpetrators by splashing their names, faces, and
motivations across cable news and social media platforms alike. Preventing the next
terrorist from ever self-radicalizing online is a noble goal, but it can only be
achieved through a joint effort that stretches across society and unites it as a whole.

CONCLUSION
Social media was all fun and games (or perhaps cats and memes) until
people started getting hurt. Society is beginning to reckon with the absolute power,
both for good and for evil, that modern technology has brought about with instant
unfiltered global communications. Like all other facets of society, terror
organizations have latched onto the previously untapped abilities of these tools and
utilized them for their own nefarious purposes. This study highlighted a number of
important findings pertaining to this reality. First, social media has allowed for a
reversal of the terror recruitment process. Now, vulnerable individuals can find
their way to the propaganda of recruiters instead of the other way around. Second,
social media expands the reach of these recruiters past geographic constraints. No
longer must they worry about being caught during the process of crossing
international borders, much less the expense of it all. Instead, they can access
potential new members anywhere in the world, at any given time, at no cost. Third,
social media can create a virtual community and echo chamber for radical beliefs.
It allows for terror-minded groups and individuals to control the messaging that is
bombarding isolated recruits such that they begin to internally embrace the group
identity process and the confirmation bias that accompanies it. Finally, and most
importantly, social media can suffice as a medium to fully radicalize an individual
without the need for any direct contact by a radical group. This is a fundamental
shift from what used to be theorized about what was required for the radicalization
of new terrorists. While the group identity and isolation process is still important,
it can be achieved solely through self-radicalization means online as demonstrated
in the 2019 Christchurch terror attack. Counterterrorism efforts around the world
must now ask if new measures are necessary to combat the process of social media
radicalization and determine what research needs to be done accordingly. Finally,
governments, social media companies, and society itself must all ask what
responsibility falls on them to adapt to and ultimately prevent social media
radicalization in the future.
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